Simulation models are generally costly tools to use in systems analyses. Whenever applicable, a simple analytic model is preferable. However, in many cases the conditions assumed by solvable analytic models do not hold in the real world; hence an analyst would hesitate to use them. A simulation can be used to suggest an appropriate approximate model and to determine how good an approximation a given analytic model is. We show how simulations of New York City's fire and police operations have been used to develop and validate simple analytic models that are now being used to analyze the deployment of resources in these two services.
an alarm, where the analytic model was suggested (and verified) by an analysis of simulation runs that had been made years earlier for other purposes. 4. A model for estimating the number of fire companies that will be busy at alarms, where the model was developed before the simulation was written but was verified several years later using the results of simulations that were run before the validation effort was begun.
These examples are discussed briefly in Sections 1-4; detailed descriptions are given in [10] . A concluding section briefly discusses the cost and other advantages of using analytic models in these cases.
ALLOCATING POLICE PATROL RESOURCES
In [17] a queuing model is proposed to represent the patrol activities of a police command. A patrol car is dispatched immediately to answer a call for service if one is available; otherwise, the call is queued at the dispatching center. Queued calls are served in order of their assigned priority. What is desired is a way of relating queuing delays to N, the number of cars assigned to the command, so that N can be chosen ra-
tionally.
A queuing model that might be used in this situation is the simple M/M/N priority model of Cobham [6] . [16] . The simulation included the complexities mentioned above as well as others, and used actual call histories in the precinct for arrivals and service times. We compared simulation results to those obtained from the queuing model with the same average call rate and the same average service time. The results, described below, were sufficiently close to give us and the Police Department confidence that the queuing model could be used instead of the simulation model.
Based on the call rate, average service time, and number of servers, the queuing model gives the probability distribution of the number of calls being serviced and the number waiting to be dispatched. From this distribution one can obtain q, the probability that all N patrol cars are busy, and D, the average time a call will spend in queue before being dispatched (and other performance measures).
To test this model, we used it to calculate q and D as functions of N and then compared the results to those obtained from the simulation model. One NYPD precinct, the 71st Precinct in Brooklyn, was chosen for study because a rich set of data on its operations was available. We considered each of the three shifts or "tours" worked by the policemen: tour 1-midnight to 8:00 a.m.; tour 2-8:00 a.m. to 4 :00 p.m.; tour 3-4:00 p.m. to midnight.
The average service time was approximately the same for all tours. The queuing model was used to analyze conditions for tours 1 and 3 with different numbers of cars on duty. The simulation was then run for these values of N. using as input a historical stream of calls for a given tour. We used the actual time each call was received and its actual service time, location, and priority. (The input stream for the simulation of a given tour was prepared from computerized records maintained by the NYPD by concatenating all of the calls received during that tour during July and August 1972. For example, when simulating tour 3, the last call before midnight on one day would be followed by the first call after 4:00 p.m. on the following day.) Because of the type of applications we had in mind, we were particularly interested in finding out whether the queuing model would predict the "elbow" in these functions-the point at which the curves begin to rise steeply and performance begins to degrade badly. It appears to do so.
The Police Department accepted the fact that the queuing model represents a reasonable approximation to the dispatching and service activities of the patrol force. The model has been imbedded in a computer program called the Patrol Car Allocation Model [5] , which the Police Department has begun to use as an aid in determining the number of patrol cars to assign to duty during each tour in each police precinct.
ESTIMATING FIRE COMPANY RESPONSE DISTANCES
Kolesar and Blum [14] derived an inverse square-root relationship between the average distance traveled by fire companies responding to calls in a region and the number of locations from which they respond. The relationship was derived under idealized conditions: an infinitely large region in which the units are located either uniformly on a grid or purely at random, and in which calls for service are distributed homogeneously in space, while emergency vehicles travel along simple response paths. However, to have practical usefulness, it was important to show that the relationship provided a reasonable approximation to actual average response distances under more realistic conditions. An existing simulation of New York City fire fighting operations was used to test the validity of the model for fire company responses. The simulation program is documented in [1] , its design and development are described in [2] , and its use in policy analysis is described in [3] . Two versions of the square-root relationship were to be tested by simulation: 
where n-b is the long-run average of N and D(n) is the long-run average of ED(N). Since n is a major policy variable under management's control, this relationship is of more general interest than (1).
Ignall et a!.
Verifying these relationships by gathering empirical data from Fire Department operations would have been an extremely difficult task. In fact, verifying (2) would have required the Department to vary the number of units operating in an experimental region at different timesan unthinkable procedure, especially if the changes meant using so few companies that lives and property were endangered. Instead, by means of simulation these tests were able to be made safely and economically without modifying Fire Department operations.
To validate and test the two relationships, seven runs were made with the model of fire fighting operations in the Bronx (Table I ). In each case the alarms were distributed probabilistically among 358 locations accord- 1  30  31  37  2  5  31  37  3  5  24  37  4  10  20  37  5  30  20  37  6  5  12  37  7  10 The closeness of the fitted curves to the data points, the near coincidence of the two curves and the closeness of the estimated exponent A in the more general model to -0.500 all confirm the validity of the model. Reference [14] provides additional details of these tests.
Uses of the Square-Root Model
The distance that responding fire units travel to reach fire alarms is an important measure of the service being provided by the Fire Department. By being able to predict the average response distance in a region as a function of alarm rate, the number of units assigned to the region, and other measurable parameters of the region, allocation policies can be evaluated quickly without the use of simulation. Among the many questions that the Fire Department of New York has already used the squareroot model to answer are:
1. What will be the effect on response distance of removing a company from a region? 2. How should the number of units on duty be varied over the day (as the alarm rate varies) to maintain a given average response distance in a region? 3. How many fire units will be required in the future under projected alarm rates to maintain desired average response distances?
The time units spend traveling to reach alarms is another important measure. A travel-time model, based on the square-root model for distances and the results of a field experiment in which fire company responses were timed, has also been developed and tested in the simulation by Kolesar [13] .
PREDICTING THE NUMBER OF UNITS SENT TO A FIRE ALARM
In New York City, dispatching rules for an incoming alarm are governed by the "alarm assignment card" for the fire alarm box closest to the alarm. The first line of an alarm assignment card contains the names of the three closest engine companies and the two closest ladder companies. The traditional policy for alarms turned in by box had been to send whichever first line companies were available, and "special call" companies further down on the card if necessary to assure a response of at least one engine and one ladder. As a result of this policy (which We call a "New York 3" dispatching policy for engines and a "New York 2" policy for ladders), the number of engines and the number of ladders actually sent to a box alarm were random variables between 1 and 3.
We were concerned with predicting how the actual number of units dispatched depended on the average unit availability in the surrounding region. By analyzing simulation runs that had been made for other purposes, we derived a simple relationship between the number of units sent and the average unit availability when a "New York" dispatching policy is used [11] .
In this section we discuss the use of simulation, deriving and verifying this relationship for the New York 2 policy for ladders. In similar ways we have derived and tested relationships for other dispatching policies. Let "a" be the average fraction of the time a ladder company is available. Define P as the probability that 2 ladders are dispatched to an incident under the New York 2 policy during a period in which the average availability is a. A good fit to the simulation data was found by using:
P=a2
(3) This relationship would be true if:
1. The average availability were the same for every ladder company in the region; and 2. The event that any particular ladder company is available were independent of the status of all other ladder companies.
Neither of these conditions is true, yet the relationship appears to be a good approximation. In fact, the validity of relationship (3) was discovered in the course of attempting to see how poor a2 is as an estimate of P. The relationship was developed from a set of nine simulation runs that had originally been made to test the effects at different alarm rates of both adding new companies to an area and modifying the dispatching policy (see [3] ). The simulation model mentioned in Section 2 was used. For each simulation run we calculated the fraction of time each ladder company was available. We then obtained the average a of these availabilities over all the ladder companies in the region. For all incidents in the region for which the dispatching policy was New York 2, we determined the proportion that received two ladders as their initial dispatch (these data had been part of the normal output from all simulation runs). The results in Table II show that P was very close to a2.
The relationship was then validated by analyzing the results on a different set of simulations that had also been run previously but had not been examined during the derivation of the relationship. The original objective of these runs had been to study the effects of matching the number of fire engines on duty more closely to the time-varying alarm rate. Results of these simulations were analyzed and compared to the results predicted by the relationship (see Table III ). On the basis of this comparison, we were able to conclude that the relationship did provide a useful approximation to the actual field-dispatching behavior. Since availability can be predicted from the alarm rate, service time distribution, and number of companies stationed in the region, we have used this relationship instead of the simulation to analyze the effects of various Fire Department deployment options on the number of units dispatched.
ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF FIRE COMPANIES WORKING AT ALARMS
Chaiken [4] proposed a queuing model of the number of fire companies busy working at alarms. The model gives the long-run probability dis-tribution of the number of busy companies. Its assumptions are much closer to reality than those of the models in Sections 1 and 2-nonexponential service times are allowed and there are no assumptions about the geographical distribution of alarms or companies. Therefore, the model had been used for planning purposes in New York City before we compared its predictions with simulation results. We discuss the model and its assumptions and how we validated it using results from simulation experiments carried out several years earlier for other purposes.
In Chaiken's model is a generalization of Erlang's formulas [7] , which Khintchine [12] proved valid for the case of an infinite server queue and general service times. Chaiken finds closed-form expressions for the probability distribution of the number of busy servers. These expressions depend upon easy-to-compute convolutions that involve alarm rates and the worktime distributions of the various stages. The expressions can be used to decide how many emergency units to locate in any specified geographical region. Enough units can be assigned to the region so that the probability that more than that number are busy does not exceed a certain threshold, say 2%.
Validating the Model
To test the model with empirical data would be very difficult, if not impossible. An important problem in this regard is that the model gives patched depend on the number available when the alarm occurs. In addition, there is a finite number of units in the simulation while the queuing model assumes an infinite number. Units can be dispatched across region boundaries, and there is a "relocation" procedure that will temporarily reassign units to firehouses other than their home houses if protection in a region is too low [15] . The simulation has a set of incident types based on the number of units required by the incident and their service times. We were therefore able to designate the stages and stage durations of the incidents according to the structure of the queuing model. The simulation that had been con-structed years before we carried out this validation exercise was clearly not designed with this test in mind. Its printed output reports did not include the data we needed for the test. Fortunately, an output tape had been created from each simulation run that recorded the status of every fire-fighting unit at 15-minute intervals of simulated time. Using tapes from past simulation runs, we were able to create histograms of the number of busy units.
The output tapes from four simulation runs, each for a different alarm rate (5, 10, 20, and 30 alarms per hour), produced 24 sets of test data when engines were considered separately from ladders and the Bronx was considered as a whole as well as in two parts (north and south). For each of these data sets we estimated the parameters of the queuing model from the simulation data and then computed the "theoretical" distribution of the number of busy units.
The results in each case were extraordinarily good. Plots of the theoretical frequencies and those produced by the simulation show a very close correspondence. Figures 5 and 6 are a sample of the results. We remark that although the fits are quite close "by eyeball," they fail the chi-square goodness-of-fit test. The reason is that the sample sizes are very large: they range from 430 to 2871 observations. However, the issue should be whether the fit is close enough for policy analysis purposes. We feel that these comparisons validate the model for the decision-making applications for which the queuing model was created.
CONCLUSIONS
The four examples we have just discussed illustrate the use of simulation to develop and validate analytic models. The reason for doing so is to give the potential user of the analytic model confidence that it is a safe substitute for the more accurate simulation model.
What are the advantages of analytic models over continued use of simulation models in these and other cases? In a narrow sense, the analytic models are cheaper to use. Calculations with a square-root model can be made using a desk calculator; the queuing models would require a few minutes at the terminal of a time-shared computer system. Thus, performance characteristics for a range of policy choices can be produced quickly for at most a few dollars of computer time. In contrast, the simulation models would typically require several runs at perhaps $10 to $100 each, and a turnaround time of several hours or days for each run.
In a broader sense, the analytic models offer even more substantial advantages. Two of the most important are: 1. They can be imbedded in other models. For example, the square-root model is an integral part of procedures for choosing the number of fire companies [18] and the number of police patrol cars [5] to assign to different regions of the city. 2. They require far less detailed input than simulation models, which saves both time and money. For example, the preparation of a simulation input tape for two months of police patrol activity (see Section 1) in another precinct in New York or in another city might take several weeks. Abstracting the essential information needed for the M/M/N queuing model might take a few minutes if summary statistics on call for service and service times were available, as they often are.
